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1. This introduction 
draws on ‘The Politics 
of Cultural Policy’, 
my inaugural lecture 
at the University of 
Glasgow, delivered on 
25 March 2009.
Introduction
Cultural and communications policy 
and the stateless nation1
Philip Schlesinger
It is indeed an honour and a great pleasure to be asked to write the intro-
ductory words for the Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies. 
My relationship with Catalonia dates from the late 1980s when together 
with my then colleagues at the University of Stirling, I engaged in two 
years of acciones integradas with colleagues at the Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona. From Scotland, the obvious point of comparison with Catalonia 
was the common condition of the ‘stateless nation’, a term that while it 
suggests a teleological lack also entails the recognition of a special status, 
a distinctive socio-cultural space and often a specific institutional complex. 
Two decades ago, we were interested in exploring the highways and by-
ways of media and culture in two national societies each of which enjoyed 
considerable autonomy within a larger state. We raised many questions in 
the course of some intensive and probing discussions. Perhaps one that we 
did not consider explicitly enough was our own role as academic analysts 
and in some cases, protagonists, intervening (or attempting to intervene) 
in questions of policy and public debate. 
In these introductory remarks to CJCS, therefore, I wish to make good 
an omission and raise some questions about the roles of academics as 
intellectuals sometimes involved in the fields of cultural and communica-
tions policy formation. I hope that in various ways this is a theme that the 
journal will stimulate and air. The policy that concerns CJCS’s readership 
is made at the intersection between culture and politics. It brings into rela-
tion diverse ways of life and models of cultural production with the institu-
tionalised form of the state. That is because in most practical respects, the 
politics of cultural policy still plays itself out within the political systems 
and the national public spheres of states. 
While the state can be a useful analytical framework, it has its limi-
tations. It is limited not only because the idea of cultural and communi-
cations sovereignty is challenged by global flows and transnational 
systems of governance but also because so-called nation-states com-
monly contain multiethnic and multicultural societies. States – as all 
students and citizens of stateless nations know – do not necessarily 
coincide with their component nations. And multilevel government 
coupled with multinationality, multiethnicity and multicultures adds to 
the complexity of how we must conceive of the shaping of cultural and 
communications policy. 
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If states orientate themselves to the extra-territorial demands that 
shape their policies today, they also cannot avoid addressing their own 
internal cultural diversity – unless they seek to ignore or repress it. Cultural 
policy broadly understood is moulded by the tensions between profit and 
aesthetic value, by the shifting boundaries between the private and the 
public, by the vagaries of social and cultural inclusion and exclusion, and 
so forth. It is consequently – and properly – a key playground for intellec-
tuals amongst whom we should and do include academics.
In this connection, Zygmunt Bauman (1992) has argued that modern 
intellectuals arose with the emergence of culture itself, culture being 
conceived as an autonomous space for action. Bauman has described intel-
lectuals as a key expert stratum that developed with the Enlightenment. 
Their initial role, he argues, was that of ‘legislator’. They articulated the 
ideology of a new order impatient of diversity and backwardness and were 
in the vanguard of centralising polities and cultures. In post-modernity, 
where epistemological certainties have collapsed, Bauman suggests, the role 
of intellectuals has shifted from legislator to ‘interpreter’, to a more modest 
role of making sense of cultures. They are largely disconnected from power.
For his part, Edward Said (1994) has also tried to describe ‘a specific 
public role in society’ for the intellectual. Where Bauman’s argument is 
sociological Said’s is normative. The choice for Said is either one of work-
ing inside the power structure or of being powerless. He urges public intel-
lectuals to side with the weak and the dispossessed. His conception of the 
intellectual is one of ‘speaking truth to power’. For Said, to speak within a 
national discourse is to occupy a kind of prison house that limits our dis-
cursive independence and our horizons. He therefore celebrates the role of 
the intellectual as an outsider. To stand outside, he suggests, gives you 
both epistemological and moral advantages. Consequently, exile – both 
actual and metaphorical – is the only state that fits true intellectual 
endeavour. Said, of course, was an exile; and so too is Bauman, although 
he has not argued that this condition confers special advantages every-
where and always. 
Both Bauman’s and Said’s positions are highly questionable. Bauman’s 
valuable insight is that the breakdown of traditional orders turns culture 
into a distinct sphere of action. Culture suddenly becomes something to be 
managed and it is therefore central to intellectuals’ self-conceptions, because 
culture is their living space. But contemporary intellectuals are not all sim-
ply interpreters. There is good empirical evidence that the desire to legislate 
for how culture should be shaped and turned to profit remains very power-
ful in our times. Some intellectuals do indeed find ways of acting as legisla-
tors, even if that often means shaping legislation through interpretation. So 
the ideological struggle over visions of the cultural order is not at all inno-
cent but has major consequences. That is particularly so where those who 
articulate ideological visions are close to the centres of power. 
Said has written eloquently on the consolations of outsider-ness. 
However, this limiting conception polarises intellectuals into the co-opted 
v the free, the clean v the corrupt, the principled opponent v the compliant 
bootlicker, the saint v the sinner. Although it is neat, this schema distorts 
the actual complexity of how contemporary intellectuals (academics 
included) address the world of policy and politics.
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We may look to yet another exile, the critical theorist Theodor Adorno 
(1991: 89) for a more grounded view on the role of expertise in cultural 
policy. Analysing what he disparagingly called ‘the culture industry’, 
Adorno thought that intellectuals were mostly ‘servile’. He loathed the idea 
of an administered culture. And cultural policy is nothing if not adminis-
tered by public authorities. Adorno saw culture as the source of the ‘critical 
impulse’. It was the counterpoint to an administered society that had lost 
its spontaneity (1991: 100). However, despite the icy grip of administra-
tion, Adorno believed that a critically self-aware cultural policy was feasi-
ble and that expertise could be used ‘for the protection of cultural matters 
from the realm of control by the market’ (1991: 112). In short, Adorno 
thought experts working within institutions to pursue culturally progres-
sive ends could – in Bauman’s terms – be legislators rather than just inter-
preters. That is precisely what my own research into the formation of 
creative economy policy suggests (Schlesinger 2007, 2009). Whether the 
ends pursued are necessarily ‘progressive’ or not is quite another matter. 
What might entitle intellectuals to intervene in policy debate? Policy-
relevant expertise is established in numerous ways. In academia, it is built 
upon research and scholarship, as well as upon the practical experience of 
advising and engaging in both public and private arenas. It is a truism 
that we need resources to undertake research. So we have to decide where 
our funds are going to come from and what are the costs and benefits that 
attach to particular sources. In our complex research economy, we may 
and do take on a variety of roles simultaneously. What we decide to do at 
any time is shaped by the constraints and opportunities we face. 
It is a fundamental value for academics to seek the maximum inde-
pendence of thought in order to produce high quality research. But it is 
not always possible. The underlying relationship to funding often affects 
the independence, framing, pace and scope of what is done. To oversim-
plify: receiving a research council award generally gives you more auton-
omy than working as a consultant with a defined brief and an importunate 
client who is a mere mouse’s click away.
In reality, virtually no source of funding is utterly neutral in its impact 
on how we think about policy questions. National research councils, foun-
dations, government departments, public bodies, charities and the 
European Commission all have their own agendas. How they articulate 
their ‘strategic priorities’ will always have effects on what we do and how 
we think. So too do universities’ own research strategies.
As academics, we also have to think what it is to be a citizen-researcher. 
If we are working in areas of public policy interest, we simply cannot avoid 
addressing how we engage as experts in the public sphere, in nations, 
states and internationally. We have obligations to disseminate our work 
widely. These derive purely from the fact of our having in-depth and 
wide-ranging knowledge and the need to communicate this. We have 
been socially privileged to accumulate our expertise over time and in an 
open society there is a general interest in sharing it as widely as possible. 
There are various ways in which we can do this. According to Edward 
Said’s exilic ideal we should contribute to the public debate as outsiders. 
This view derives from a classic image of the public intellectual as engaged 
that dates from the Dreyfus affaire of the 1890s. Of course, public intellectuals 
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aren’t always outsiders – far from it, in fact. And outsiders’ careers may 
differ enormously over their lifetimes. Some become licensed commentators 
with their own slots and spots and are garlanded with honours. Others are 
condemned to obscurity, and if they’re really lucky, a posthumous revival. 
Even in the mainstream, very few public intellectuals achieve really 
significant and sustained access to the airwaves and the newspaper 
co lumns, or enjoy the status of a blogger with influence. As Régis Debray 
(1979) pointed out some thirty years ago, the post World War II rise of 
celebrity media intellectuals created a star system for the few. The overall 
significance of the university as a widespread source of legitimate knowledge 
consequently diminished. The growing centrality of popular media has 
changed the rules of access to the public sphere and transformed the 
nature of a successful performance. 
There have been repeated attempts to characterise the changing nature 
of expertise and intellectual life in our times. In the late nineteen-seventies, 
the sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1979) wrote about the emergence of new 
powerful class of symbol-manipulating intellectuals immersed in the ‘cul-
ture of critical discourse’. In very similar vein, at the start of the nough-
ties, the celebrity public policy guru Richard Florida (2002; 2005) hailed 
the rise and flight of the creative class, this time to admiring gasps of offi-
cial credulity. Here, at last, was a sellable vision.
Such arguments relate to structural changes in capitalism since World 
War II and the emergence of a so-called ‘knowledge economy’. Economic 
restructuring has changed how we think about and value expertise. 
Gouldner and Florida – like Daniel Bell (1973) before them - have been 
part of a tradition of trying to paint new pictures of class and power as 
industrial society is left increasingly behind. 
While we academics might be flattered to be thought members of a 
wider knowledge or creative class let us take pause for thought. If class 
power has come our way, I can only observe that – as elsewhere – it is 
unevenly distributed. With very few exceptions, it is hard to be heard in 
the world of cultural and communications policy formation and harder 
still to have effects. That is because the shaping of policy has become both 
more competitive and more complex. The multiplication of cultural and 
communication management consultancies, the expansion of special 
advisers in government, the growth of in-house research teams inside 
communications regulators, the development of specialist media and com-
munications business journalism – all of these have recast the space avail-
able to the academy to make its views known and be taken seriously. They 
have reshaped the public sphere. And in truth, we academics have often 
not helped ourselves by making policy-relevant research into a minority 
pursuit.
That said, a range of pertinent interventions is possible. These depend 
on your taking a normative view of the academic as a member of a class of 
experts with a public role to play in influencing and shaping debates on 
matters of public policy. But this is not simply about opposing established 
orders everywhere, à la Said. It is more complex. It is engagement gener-
ated by our own cultural practices that lead us, as a matter of course, to 
contribute to discussion and deliberation through various forms of public 
involvement. Oppositional critique is only one of the available options. 
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On rare occasions, the professor might become a minister of culture 
(or equivalent), as has happened at a Catalan level with Joan Manuel 
Tresserras, the current Conseller de Cultura i Mitjans de Comunicació. 
His eventual reflections on his time in politics will make interesting read-
ing. But the majority of openings to influence are much more modest. 
Public engagement may and does involve the production and publica-
tion of research. But it can also entail academics joining boards and 
commissions, supplying expert advice to governments and agencies, 
advising parliamentary committees, making submissions to public 
inquiries, contributing commentaries to the media and blogs and so 
forth. Because, in practice, the social organisation of policy expertise is 
heavily concentrated in elite circles, there is an additional democratic 
role in working with, and advising, civil society groups of all kinds. This 
extends the limited scope of the so-called policy community and expands 
activity in the public sphere. 
Such engagement is complex because we each have values and beliefs 
and we may be linked to political projects of various kinds. It is a matter of 
choice and principle whether we avoid institutional capture by the policy 
world of government departments, state agencies and commercial inter-
ests. Because universities give them space, academics are well placed to 
make a disinterested contribution to public policy. Disinterest does not 
imply a lack of commitment to values and ideals. It concerns whether or 
not we seek benefits from our advice and whether or not that is a prime 
motivating force.
Nations without states typically have a complex public sphere, and 
this has direct implications for the nature of our engagement. Indeed, 
rather than a single public sphere, the stateless nation is more likely to 
be situated in a dual sphere of publics. Ideal-typically, the nation has its 
own cultural institutions and media, and often a language that differs 
from the lingua franca of the state. Under non-repressive conditions, if 
there is not a separate indigenous system of representative politics, there 
is likely to be a distinct administrative apparatus, bound into that of the 
wider state. Nationals of stateless nations are therefore routinely exposed 
to their own national public sphere, the local, intimate and proximate, 
and also that of the wider state itself. This simple dual sphere model suf-
fices to make the point that although there is space for convergence 
between the operations of the national and state public spheres, there is 
also space for dislocation, divergence, contradiction and dispute about 
boundaries, competencies and resources. All of the latter, of course, act-
ing as generators of policy shifts while being meat and drink to the aca-
demic analyst.
In stateless nations, to intervene in the domains of culture and com-
munication is therefore potentially doubly complex. Much depends on 
the nature of the autonomy afforded the stateless nation, which is in 
any case likely to be chronically renegotiated. There is an obligation to 
understand both levels of the polity, to know the lines of domination 
and subordination and to understand the scope and limits of interven-
tion by word and deed. These are necessary preliminaries for the 
researcher-citizen to be involved in shaping a social world that is also 
his or her object of analysis.
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